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Abstract
The sensitivity to fairness undergoes relevant changes across development. Whether such changes depend on primary
inequity aversion or on sensitivity to a social norm of fairness is still debated. Using a modified version of the Ultimatum
Game that creates informational asymmetries between Proposer and Responder, a previous study showed that both
perceptions of fairness and fair behavior depend upon normative expectations, i.e., beliefs about what others expect one
should do in a specific situation. Individuals tend to comply with the norm when risking sanctions, but disregard the norm
when violations are undetectable. Using the same methodology with children aged 8–10 years, the present study shows
that children’s beliefs and behaviors differ from what is observed in adults. Playing as Proposers, children show a self-serving
bias only when there is a clear informational asymmetry. Playing as Responders, they show a remarkable discrepancy
between their normative judgment about fair procedures (a coin toss to determine the offer) and their behavior (rejection
of an unfair offer derived from the coin toss), supporting the existence of an outcome bias effect. Finally, our results reveal
no influence of theory of mind on children’s decision-making behavior.
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Introduction
Recent research on decision-making in children has shown
strong inequity aversion in Ultimatum games [1]. In such games,
children consistently reject unfair offers [2]. This might be due to
primary inequity aversion or to sensitivity to social norms of
fairness. The interpretation of such results would differ depending
on the reason why offers are rejected. Inequity aversion motives
would be independent of the procedure that generated the offer,
whereas rejection due to social norms would be sensitive to process
and intentions. For example, adults who receive a low offer from a
random device (coin toss, dice, roulette, etc.) normally accept the
offer, yet almost 50% reject offers of 20% or less coming from an
individual [3]. According to the view of social norms we adopt
here [4], the decision to accept or reject an offer depends upon the
empirical and normative expectations entertained by the individ-
ual. We adopt here Bicchieri’s ‘‘constructivist’’ definition of social
norm [4]: A norm exists if a sufficient number of people believe (a)
that it exists and applies to a specific class of situations, (b) that
most people are following it in those situations and (c) that most
people believe one ought to follow it. Individuals will prefer to
follow the norm whenever all these conditions are satisfied. An
empirical expectation is the expectation that other people in the
relevant population comply with the norm, and a normative
expectation is the belief that other people in the relevant
population expect the individual to obey the norm and may
sanction transgressions. Individuals will thus have a conditional
preference to follow a fairness norm depending upon the existence
of the relevant empirical and normative expectations [4]. It is also
important to observe that – in order to assess the presence of a
norm – we have to independently measure individuals’ normative
expectations. That is, whenever there is a general agreement that
most members of the relevant group consider certain behaviors to
be fair, we can be reasonably sure that a shared norm of fairness
exists.
Even if we are sure a fairness norm applies to a given situation,
consensus does not imply universal conformity. Bicchieri and
Chavez [5] manipulated adults’ expectations about fairness by
creating informational asymmetries about the offer choices
available to the Proposer in an Ultimatum game, and found that
behavior varies accordingly. Proposers and Responders did show a
remarkable degree of agreement in their beliefs about which
choices are considered fair by a majority of participants, and it is
precisely this mutual consistency in normative second-order beliefs
(normative expectations) that is a mark of the existence of a shared
norm. Moreover, when normative expectations are present
without the sanctioning element, so that such expectations can
be violated at no cost, Bicchieri and Chavez show that individuals
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tend to disobey the norm, since the victim will not be able to
distinguish an intentional action from chance [6]. The results of
the Bicchieri and Chavez experiment show that most (adult)
participants are sensitive to the manipulation of information.
Furthermore, for this manipulation to be understood and
exploited, participants must have an advanced meta-representa-
tional ability. For example, a subject must be able to replicate
others’ beliefs as well as others’ potential responses to a range of
actions. Meta-representations are at the core of theory of mind,
the ability to predict and interpret our own and others’ behavior in
terms of mental states [7]. The acquisition of the elementary level
of this competence appears around four years of age, when
children solve the first-order false belief task that shows the ability
of first-level recursive thinking (I think that you think…) [8]. This
ability evolves when the child, approximately at the age of eight,
solves the second-order false belief task, showing the ability to use
second-level recursive thought (‘‘I think that you think that she/he
thinks’’…) [9]. The theory of mind has been called the ‘‘ability
among abilities’’, as it is not simply an independent competence
used in specific and restricted contexts (for example, the false belief
task), but it is one of the most important cognitive skills used in
social and strategic reasoning [10–12]. This fact is particularly
evident in studies that explore theory of mind development in a
life-span perspective [13] and in age-related clinical conditions
[14,15].
Experiments with the Ultimatum game and related games can
help us gain insight in what people believe to be fair outcomes in
cases where some good is to be shared among claimants. In such
games, a Proposer must offer a share of some good (usually money)
provided by the experimenter to an anonymous Responder, who
can accept or reject the offer. If the offer is rejected, both players
get nothing. Such games offer the opportunity to combine strategic
thinking with sensitivity to fairness in various degrees. Sensitivity to
fairness may mean two very different things. On the one hand, it
may refer to a basic aversion to unequal outcomes. On the other
hand, it may refer to awareness of a social norm of fairness, and
strategic application of the norm in all cases in which transgressing
it leads to negative consequences. Experiments on Ultimatum
games usually do not make this distinction that is nonetheless
crucial in predicting future behavior. Inequity aversion should be a
stable disposition, whereas norm-following will predictably depend
on players’ expectations. Experimental results support the second
hypothesis [5], since manipulating expectations led players to
radically change offer behavior.
Ultimatum games experiments played by children do not
usually distinguish between the two interpretations of ‘sensitivity to
fairness’. They do show important age differences in children’s
behavior in the Ultimatum Game [1,16–18] as well as in the link
between fair behavior and theory of mind [2,19–21]. Sally and
Hill [20], for example, found that children’s progressive mentaliz-
ing ability explains greater avoidance of unsuccessful ultimatum
proposals in older children. They explicitly refer to fairness norms,
and state that ‘‘the development of Theory-of-Mind skills may help
the child first to recognize and act upon relevant norms of
behavior, such as fairness, and later, to stretch those norms and
improvise away from them when the situation calls for it’’ (p. 94).
The present research aimed to replicate the Bicchieri and
Chavez [5] experiment with school-age children. We were
interested in assessing whether children are sensitive to fairness
(either as inequity aversion or a norm of fairness) and whether
informational manipulations lead to behavioral changes. In the
latter case, responsiveness to information manipulations would
suggest that children prefer to follow a fairness norm on condition
of having certain expectations, but not unconditionally. On the
other hand, unresponsiveness and a preference for fair outcomes
would indicate a more basic disposition toward fairness, indepen-
dent of the existence of norms that dictate fair behavior. Our
results are mixed. When in the Proposer’s role, children are indeed
responsive to information manipulations. However, Responders
uniformly rejected unfair offers in any condition. Children, as
opposed to adults, overweight consequences to the detriment of
procedures that they otherwise find fair. We also wanted to assess
the children’s theory of mind, operationalized as false belief
understanding, and relate different levels of false belief under-
standing to fair behaviors. We used the false belief task that is
considered the litmus test of theory of mind, even if it is not
exhaustive of the full mentalizing abilities of children [10,22].
The four important results we draw are that: a) there is
convergence of children’s normative expectations about what the
majority believes is fair. We can therefore conclude that children
share and are aware of fairness norms. However, differently from
adults, both an equal split and the use of a random device (a coin
toss) are considered equally fair by almost all participants. b)
Children are sensitive to information manipulations. In different
information conditions, children make different offers. In other
words, it appears that children decide how to split the good on the
basis of what they think that the other children know about the set
of available offers. c) Unfair offers, however obtained, are
uniformly rejected in all conditions. In particular, there is an
inconsistency between the acknowledgment of the procedural
fairness of a coin toss and acceptance of outcomes that result from
it. Although the use of a coin toss is universally perceived as fair by
children, an unfavorable result is consistently rejected. This result
seems to suggest that inequity aversion is a more primitive
disposition than the ability to recognize the causal link between the
procedure (coin toss) – chosen because considered fair - and the
outcome of that procedure. d) Measures of first and second order
false belief understanding do not seem to influence decision
making. Although the idea that theory of mind is involved in
decision making remains theoretically grounded, the tasks used to
measure theory of mind may not have grasped aspects of this skill
involved in the ultimatum game employed in the current research.
Methods
Participants
Participants of the study described in the paper have been
treated according to the APA ethical standards and informed
consent was obtained. The study was approved by the Local Ethic
Committee (Universita` Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milan, Italy).
Official authorizations to carry on the research were provided by
the Director of the School and by the teachers of the classes
involved. Informed written consent was obtained from the parents
of each participant. One hundred and two children from a
primary school (middle SES) in northern Italy took part in the
research. They were divided in two age groups: young (N= 42,
male = 24, female = 18, mean age= 8.8 years old) and old (N= 60,
male = 36, female = 24, mean age = 10.9 years old).
Game Paradigm
The experimental design was the same as the one devised by
Bicchieri and Chavez [5] with a variant of the Ultimatum Game –
UG – [23]. Playing with children, we did not use money, but
tokens that would have been changed into candies or stickers
according to the child’s preference. Before explaining the rules of
the game, the child was asked to state her/his preference between
candies and stickers, and was told that he/she would have played a
game where he/she could win a number of them. Then the child
Fairness Norms and Theory of Mind in Children
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was explained the rules of the game: one participant, the Proposer,
received 10 tokens – provided by the experimenter – and then
proposed a division of those tokens to a Responder. If the
Responder accepted, both players received the amounts specified
in the proposal. If the Responder rejected, both players received
nothing. Following the variant by Bicchieri and Chavez [5], the
Proposer chose one from the following three options:
(5,5) - to propose 5 tokens for the Proposer, and 5 tokens for the
Responder;
(8,2) - to propose 8 tokens for the Proposer, and 2 tokens for the
Responder; and
Coin - to let the outcome of a fair coin flip determine the
proposal: heads corresponded to (5,5), and tails to (8,2).
Procedure
Children were introduced to the experimenter, who explained
that they were going to play some games in two quiet rooms at
school. The children were randomized into one or two school
rooms upon their arrival, which determined whether they would
be a Proposer or a Responder for the duration of the study. Once
in the room with the experimenter, children received the
instructions that explained the UG, that they would play three
such games with a different child chosen at random in the other
room, that all choices and responses were strictly anonymous, and
that children would be paid with candies or stickers (as they would
prefer) at the end of the experimental session. To be sure that
children understood the anonymity condition, each child was
given an envelope containing some tickets. Each ticket had a
symbol on it, i.e. a cross, a dot, a star and so on. The child was
asked to secretly pick up one ticket, and was told that the
particular symbol on the ticket would be his/her only identifier.
Before each game the experimenter provided additional instruc-
tions to participants. Finally, Proposers completed proposal forms
and Responders responded to them. The Supporting Information
document provides the full set of instructions (see Document S1),
the proposal forms (see Document S2) and the questionnaires (see
Document S3 and Document S4) that were used to measure
Responders’ first-order normative beliefs and Proposers’ and
Responders’ second-order normative beliefs (expectations). These
measured belief variables allowed us to assess the presence of
norms, and to determine which beliefs were most relevant to
Proposers’ choices.
Salience
In each information condition, prior to making their choices, all
Responders completed a questionnaire that measured their first-
and second-order normative beliefs (see Documents S3 and S4).
The questionnaire asked whether the Responder found each of the
available choice options fair, and also what they thought the
majority of other Responders found fair. The questionnaire was
aimed at assessing whether there was an agreement in Responders’
normative expectations, an indicator of (as well as a necessary
condition for) the existence of a social norm. In addition, half of
the experimental sessions included an incentive-based question-
naire for Proposers, which they completed in each information
condition (See Document S4). These questionnaires were designed
to 1) make fairness norms more salient, and 2) test for an
agreement between Responders’ normative expectations and
Proposers’ beliefs about them. The other half of the sessions just
included the Responders’ questionnaires.
Information Conditions
Participants played three Ultimatum Games under different
information conditions in a fixed-order, within-subjects design.
1. In the full information condition, Proposers marked on a
proposal form whether their choice was (5,5), (8,2), or Coin.
Subsequently, the experimenter in the room of Responders flipped
a coin. On any forms on which the Proposer chose Coin, the
experimenter marked (5,5) or (8,2), based on the coin flip outcome.
Thus, all participants understood that the Coin option was
available and that Responders would know if the Proposer with
whom they were paired chose Coin.
2. In the private information condition, Responders did not
know that Coin was available to Proposers, and Proposers were
aware of this fact. To create this informational asymmetry, we
eliminated Coin from the proposal form, but allowed Proposers to
choose Coin by leaving the remaining options ((5,5) and (8,2))
unmarked on the form. An experimenter in the Proposers’ room
then flipped a coin. On any forms on which the Proposer chose
Coin, the experimenter marked (5,5) or (8,2), based on the coin flip
outcome. Thus, Responders only saw a form with either (5,5) or
(8,2) marked, and were unaware of the existence of the Coin
option.
3. In the limited information condition, all participants knew
that the Coin option was available, but that the Responder would
not be able to distinguish whether the Proposer chose (5,5) or (8,2)
directly, or chose Coin whose outcome was (5,5) or (8,2). To create
this information condition, we listed (5,5), (8,2), and Coin on the
proposal form, but instructed all participants that Proposers could
only choose Coin by leaving all options unmarked. After Proposers
made their choices, the experimenter in the room of Responders
privately flipped a coin. On any forms on which the Proposer
chose Coin, the experimenter marked (5,5) or (8,2), based on the
coin flip outcome. Thus, all participants understood that the
Responder would be unable to distinguish forms on which the
Proposer chose (5,5) or (8,2) directly from forms on which the
Proposer chose coin.
We followed the same fixed order as in [5] as 1) full, 2) private,
and 3) limited because a different ordering led to confusion in pilot
studies with adults. Given that children constitute our sample, we
wanted to minimize the risk of such confusion. Furthermore,
because we did not provide Proposers with feedback between
conditions, and because participants only played three games, we
expected any effects of learning without feedback [24] to be
minimal. In other words, Proposers never knew the Responders’
decision about their offer.
False belief task
We administered a modified version of the second-order false
belief task called ‘‘Look Prediction’’, which also includes the
evaluation of first-order false belief understanding [25,26]. The
child is told a story (with drawings) about Maria and Gianni who
are playing with a toy. Maria puts the toy in a wardrobe and leaves
the room, and while she is away Gianni changes the location of the
toy, putting it under the bed. The story is stopped and the child is
asked where Maria will look for the toy once back in the room (first
order false belief question). The child is then asked to justify the
response, and is further given memory and reality control
questions to assess understanding of the story. Then, the story is
resumed, with Maria returning to the room. From the open door
she sees Gianni as he is moving the toy under the bed, though
Gianni does not see Maria. The child is then asked where Gianni
thinks Maria will look for the toy once back in the room (second
order false belief question). Again, the child must justify this
answer, and is asked memory and reality control questions.
The sample was partitioned according to the answers to the
control questions. No child was excluded. Both for first order and
second order false belief understanding, the question regarding
Fairness Norms and Theory of Mind in Children
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false belief was scored 1 if correct and 0 if incorrect. The
justification question was scored 0 if incorrect, 1 if correct and
without reference to the mental activity, and 2 if correct and with
reference to the mental activity. A total score was computed both
for first order and second order false belief understanding (range 0-
3). According to this range, children were grouped in Low (0–1)
and High (2–3) second order false belief understanding.
Fairness judgments and beliefs
We coded Responders’ normative judgments about the fairness
of each proposal by condition (fair or not fair). For each condition
and proposal, we also coded whether each Responder and
Proposer believed the majority of Responders said the proposal
was fair (majority said was fair or majority said was not fair); that
is, we recorded each child’s beliefs about the distribution of the
Responders’ normative judgments.
Design and Analysis
We employed a 36262 design, crossing information (full,
private, and limited, within-participants) with salience (non-salient
and salient, between-participants) and age (8 or 10 years old).
Primary dependent variables included the Proposer’s choice of
(5,5), (8,2), or Coin and the Responder’s decision to accept or
reject, which we respectively analyzed as multinomial or binomial
responses. Nested model comparisons were based on the likelihood
ratio test. We tested for a participant-level zero-mean random
intercept to model the grouped nature of the data to account for
potential within-participant correlation [27], and also separately
estimated White-Huber robust standard errors. Finally, we
separately analyzed the effects of several covariates by condition,
including theory of mind performance (low or high), fairness
beliefs by choice (0 =majority said the choice was not fair,
1 =majority said the choice was fair), age (in months), and gender.
Hypotheses
Consistent with [5], we predicted that:
H1: Proposers will choose Coin more frequently in the Full
information condition and less frequently than 5-5 and 8-2 both in
the Private and in the Limited conditions, because in the last two
conditions Proposers will take advantage of the informational
opacity about, respectively, the existence and the use of Coin.
H2: Proposers will choose (8,2) more frequently in the Limited
information condition than in the Full information condition. The
(8,2) will be the most frequent choice in the Limited condition,
because Proposers will know that Responders will not be able to
figure out whether the 8,2 offer is intentional or results from the
Coin flip.
H3: In the Salient condition, we expected: a) more 5-5, b) more
Coin offers, and c) less 8-2 offers in any condition, because
focusing on a norm of fairness should improve norm compliance.
Furthermore:
H4: older children who act as Proposers will behave more like
adults, because strategic reasoning improves with age. More
specifically, older children will comply with the norm depending
on the fact that different information conditions entail different
possibilities of discovering transgression (in the Full condition
transgressions are immediately identified, whereas in the Limited
condition they can be only suspected). Instead, younger children
will comply with the norm more consistently in all the information
conditions, because they have a less sophisticated strategic
reasoning, and therefore they think that a potential transgression
will be always discovered.
H5: A combined effect of age and second order false belief
understanding (high-low) will affect the decision. Proposers with
high second order false belief understanding will be more
‘‘Machiavellian’’, i.e. they will try to take advantage of the
asymmetric access to information of the partner in the Limited
condition in order to disregard the fairness norm at no cost for
themselves.
H6: Responders in the Full condition will refuse the (8,2) offer
from the direct choice of the Proposer more frequently than the
(8,2) offer deriving from Coin, because children progressively
include intentions and expectations into the decision process.
Furthermore, they will accept (8,2) offers more frequently in the
Limited condition than in the Full condition because they will not
be able to figure out whether the offer is intentional or random.
Finally, we expect that these behaviors will depend on age and
high level of second order false belief understanding, because these
two factors will make children less consequentialist, i.e., more
sensitive to intentions and disposed to believe that the (8,2) offer
results from the Proposers’ fair choice of Coin.
H 7: We expect that Responders will make a decision that is
coherent with their personal normative judgment, similarly to the
finding of Bicchieri and Chavez with adults [5].
Results
Proposer Behavior
Choice by Condition, Salience, and Age. Relative to constant
choice proportions (the null hypothesis), there was a significant
effect of condition on choices (x2(4) = 9.74, p = .045), but not of
salience (x2(2) = 0.41, p = .82) or age (x2(2) = 0.20 p= .91).
Whereas adults were more inclined to choose (5,5) and less
inclined to choose (8,2) across information conditions in the
salience treatment (Bicchieri & Chavez, 2010), children’s behavior
was not influenced by salience. Moreover, there were no
significant interactions of condition and salience (x2(4) = 3.47,
p = .48), condition and age (x2(2) = 4.11, p = .13), salience and age
(x2(4) = 5.96, p= .20), or Condition6Salience6Age (x2(4) = 3.10,
p = .54).
Therefore, we estimated a multinomial logit model of choice on
condition with a participant-level random effect and a separate
multinomial logit model with robust standard errors, as shown in
Table 1.
The random effect variance was not significant (sp
2 = 11212,
p = 1.0, n.s.), and robust standard error estimates were similar to
classical standard error estimates, so we based inference on a plain
multinomial logit model of choice on condition. Figure 1 shows
choice proportions and error bars corresponding to the model of
choices by condition (residual deviance = 309.93, df = 147, ran-
dom effect variance sp2= 11–12, p = 1.0, n.s.).
Pairwise Comparisons Across Conditions
As is clear from Figure 1, (5,5) choices were stable across
conditions. This is different from adults’ results, where (5,5) in the
limited and full conditions was chosen with less frequency than
(8,2) and Coin, respectively. As hypothesized, the proportion of
coin choices in the full information condition was significantly
higher than in the private condition (.57 vs. .29, p = .003).
However, we found no support for the hypothesis that coin choices
were more frequent in the full vs. limited conditions (.57 vs. .45,
p = .12). There was marginal support for the hypothesis that the
proportion of (8,2) choices was higher in the limited vs. full
conditions (.20 vs. .10, p= .09). Proposers were clearly sensitive to
changes in information conditions and displayed strategic behavior
in the Full and Private conditions. However, their behavior in the
Fairness Norms and Theory of Mind in Children
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 4 August 2014 | Volume 9 | Issue 8 | e105024
Limited condition was very different from the more Machiavellian
adult behavior.
False belief understanding
There was no effect of Proposer second order false belief
understanding (FBU) grouping (high vs. low) on choice
(x2(2) = 1.21, p = 0.5458), nor was there a significant interaction
between second order false belief understanding grouping and
information condition (x2(4) = 6.43, p= 0.1693). Also, a combined
effect of age and second order false belief understanding grouping
on decisions was not found (x2(2) = 2.09, p = 0.3517).
Fairness Judgments
Table 2 shows Responders’ personal normative judgments (first
order normative beliefs) about the fairness of each proposal by
condition. In line with previous findings for adults [5], almost all
Responders considered (5,5) to be fair across conditions. Between
6% and 10% of children considered (8,2) to be fair, whereas
between 14% and 17% of adults found (8,2) to be fair. The most
striking difference between the two populations was the children’s
nearly unanimous judgment of Coin as fair compared to lesser
agreement over the fairness of coin in adults (94% vs. 57% judge
coin as fair in the limited condition, x2(1) = 14.2, p= .0002, and
96% vs. 64% judge coin as fair in the full condition, x2(1) = 16.1,
p,.0001). Fairness beliefs did not depend on age, gender, or false
belief understanding. Clearly, children were uniform in thinking
that both (5,5) and Coin are fair choices. In fact, when we look at
the answers that Proposers gave after they made their choices, the
two most frequent justifications of those choosing Coin were: 1. It
is okay because it gives both of us an equal chance, and 2. I chose it
because I was undecided, I did not know what to do. In both cases,
the choice of Coin was perceived as fair, even by those that openly
admitted they wanted to avoid the responsibility of choosing one of
the two other options.
Second-order Beliefs (Normative expectations) about
Responders’ fairness Judgments
Figure 2 shows the distribution of Proposers’ and Responders’
beliefs about Responders’ personal fairness judgments (see
Table 2) by condition, for the salient treatment only (as these
variables were recorded for Proposers only in the salient
condition). There is a remarkable degree of agreement across
Responders’ and Proposers’ second-order normative beliefs.
Averaging over conditions, 87.9% of Responders and 82.8% of
Proposers believed the majority of Responders indicated (5,5) was
fair. 9.1% of Responders and 13.8% of Proposers believed the
majority of Responders indicated (8,2) was fair; 87.6% of
Responders and 77% of Proposers believed the majority of
Responders indicated Coin was fair. Like the adults in [5],
children show a remarkable consistency in second-order normative
beliefs. Since consistency in normative expectations (second-order
beliefs) strongly suggests that a social norm is in place, we may
conclude that children think that a norm of fairness includes both
equal division and a fair random procedure (tossing a fair coin, in
our case). Again, there was no significant difference in the beliefs of
low and high false belief understanding (FBU) subjects, suggesting
that awareness of fairness norms may not depend upon having a
false belief comprehension of high or low sophistication.
Responder Behavior
Logistic regressions of rejections on offer, condition, Responder
false belief understanding (FBU) grouping, and their two- and
three-way interactions revealed a main effect of offer (x2
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(2) = 83.05, p,.0001), but no effects of condition (x2 (2) = 0.63,
p = .7317), FBU grouping (x2 (1) = 1.25, p = .2629), Offer x
Condition (x2 (2) = 2.32, p= .3139), Offer x FBU Group (x2
(1) = 2.45, p = .1179), Condition x FBU Group (x2 (2) = 0.31,
p = .8587), or Offer x Condition x FBU Group (x2 (2) = 1.06,
Figure 1. Choice proportions by condition. Error bars represent +/21 bootstrap standard errors.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0105024.g001
Table 2. Personal normative beliefs (fairness judgments) of Responders.
Choice
Condition (5,5) (8,2) Coin
Full 98.0% 50/51 5.9% 3/51 96.1% 49/51
Private 96.1% 49/51 7.8% 4/51
Limited 94.1% 48/51 9.8% 5/51 94.1% 48/51
Each cell contains the proportion (fraction) of Responders who indicated that the choice was fair. Note. Each cell contains the proportion (fraction) of Responders who
indicated that the choice was fair.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0105024.t002
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p= .5889). Table 3 tabulates Responder rejections by offer and
condition.
Responders uniformly rejected offers of (8,2) across all
conditions, irrespective of the reason why that outcome obtains,
as reported in Table 3. For example, in the Full information
condition, Responders who received a low payoff from a coin toss
knew it was the result of a random event. They knew the outcome
was not the result of an intentionally mean choice, but just bad
luck. Though almost all Responders uniformly considered Coin a
fair choice, this judgment was not mirrored in the rejection rates.
Adults, on the contrary, are much more consistent, as they accept
a low payoff when it is the result of a random choice [5]. Adults, in
other words, are well aware of intentions and causal processes. For
example, only 18.2% of adults rejected (8,2) in the Limited
Condition, suggesting that they entertained the possibility that
(8,2) was a result of chance. Children however completely discount
this possibility and reject (8,2) in the same high proportion (76.2%
and 76.5%) in the Limited and Full Conditions, even when (8,2) is
known to be the result of a coin flip.
It looks as if kids have acquired the sense that norms of fairness
may mean different things, but do not use this knowledge to
evaluate outcomes. When they judge outcomes, they act as pure
consequentialists. As further support to this interpretation, we
found that in the Full condition all the children who rejected 8,2
from Coin justified their choice by making a clear reference to
inequity aversion, such as I want the same number of tokens or it is
not fair that he/she has more tokens than me. Our result is in line
with other data showing that when an unfair offer is the result of
Figure 2. The proportion of Responders (left graph) and Proposers (right graph) who believed the majority of Responders
indicated each choice was fair, by condition. Error bars are unadjusted 95% confidence intervals.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0105024.g002
Table 3. Rejection rates and frequencies by offer source, offer, and condition.
Offer
Offer source (5,5) (8,2)
Full:
Direct choice 0.0% (0/17) 80.0% (4/5)
Coin flip 16.7% (2/12) 76.5% (13/17)
Private 6.9% (2/29) 86.4% (19/22)
Limited 16.7% (5/30) 76.2% (16/21)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0105024.t003
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an unintentional event, such as a roulette outcome, it is rejected by
children as much as if it results from an intentional choice [21].
Conclusions
Part of the first hypothesis, that Coin would be chosen more
frequently in the Full information condition, was supported by the
data. However, we also expected that Coin would be chosen less
frequently than 5,5 and 8,2 both in the Private and in the Limited
conditions. Coin was indeed chosen much less than 5,5 in the
Private condition, but it was the most frequent choice in the
Limited condition. Moreover, Coin and 8,2 were chosen with the
same (low) frequency in the Private condition.
The second hypothesis was only partially supported by the data:
(8,2) choices were not more frequent than other choices in the
Limited condition. Yet the data show a tendency of (8,2) to be
more frequent in the Limited condition than in the Full condition.
The remaining hypotheses were not supported by the data.
As for the Proposer perspective, children’s behavior shows
awareness of fairness norms, and the capability to use them in a
self-serving way. Whereas Coin is the most frequent choice in the
Full condition, it precipitously declines in the Private condition,
because children are aware that Responders do not know that
Coin is available in that condition. Proposers know that an offer of
(8,2) in the Private condition would be interpreted as intentional,
and thus is likely to be rejected. In the Full condition, Proposers
exploit their belief that a large majority of Responders believes
Coin is fair. Yet if we look at the expected utility of Coin, it is quite
clear that it is less fair than (5,5) for Responders. Also, the fact that
Coin is the most frequent choice in the Limited condition (where it
is public knowledge that Coin is available) suggests that children
are not as Machiavellian as adults, probably because the Limited
information context is particularly difficult to grasp. In order to
choose (8,2) in Limited, a child must not only be aware that the
Responder knows that Coin is available, but must also believe that
the Responder believes that Coin is fair and will accept a payoff of
2 as the result of chance.
The complexity of mental representations that support the
exploitative (8,2) choice in Limited may be beyond recursive
second-order thought. It may also be the case that such complexity
creates an ‘overload’, in the sense that even if the child possesses
an adequate theory of mind, it is not sufficiently robust to allow the
child to manage all the multifaceted representational content at
the same time. This might explain why the second-order false
belief understanding (high or low) has no impact on strategic
decision making in our experiment. The Private and Full
conditions, on the other hand, are quite simple to grasp, so that
first order false belief understanding – sufficiently mastered in the
age groups considered – is enough to manage such conditions.
With regard to the Responder perspective, children reject the
(8,2) offer irrespectively of its origin and information condition:
they seem to ignore the role of intentionality vs. chance, as well as
the presence of different levels of informational transparency. This
may be due to a difficulty in coordinating all these elements
(intentionality and information manipulations) in the decision
process, which would lead children to adopt a simpler con-
sequentialist approach. This difficulty could explain the incoher-
ence between personal normative judgments and behavior:
children think that the option of tossing a coin to determine an
offer is completely fair but if the result of such procedure is
unfavorable, they reject it. Adults, as found by Biccheri & Chavez
[1], are more consistent, as they rarely refuse an unfair outcome
resulting from a coin toss.
A first possible explanation of our result refers to the ‘outcome
bias’ effect, which is common also in adult judgments. For
example, Cubitt et al. [28] show that, in judging the outcomes of
social dilemmas, people who express a negative judgment of free
riding give greater weight to the consequences of actions rather
than the intentions behind those actions. In line with our findings,
Gino et al. [29] found that adults, acting as third-party observers,
judge an unfair offer of (9,1) as more morally unacceptable than a
fair offer of (5,5), even if both offers are the result of a coin toss in a
Dictator Game. Adults, however, tend to accept the unfair results
of a fair procedure, even if those who accept the unfair offer show
significant neural activations in the insula, a brain structure
devoted to processing the negative emotion of disgust [30]. This
evidence suggests that adults experience a conflict as well, because
although they ‘rationally’ accept an unfair offer from a non-human
partner they still have a negative emotional reaction. Children,
however, do not seem able to override the negative emotion
elicited by the unfairness of the offer resulting from the coin toss, as
such emotion is stronger than their belief that Coin is fair [21].
This conflict is evident in the Responders’ rejection, but not in the
Proposers’ choices. This difference is not surprising, since
Proposers do not experience a conflict between emotion and
belief, and can thus assign full weight to the judgment that Coin is
fair, and perceived as fair by all the parties.
In children, the separation of desire and belief may not yet be
complete, and thus the conflict is ‘played out’ in rejecting an offer
that, though stemming from a fair procedure, is perceived as
unfair. In fact, the development literature has consistently shown
that desire plays an important role driving children’s beliefs and
behaviors during the first years of development. Desire often
overrides belief, creating problems in theory of mind reasoning:
children fail to solve the classical false belief task because the
attribution to the story character of a desire for the hidden object
determines a distortion in the attribution of false belief. In our
study the desire for an equal outcome overrides the belief about
fair procedures, and severs the connection between beliefs and
behavior.
The inconsistency between fairness beliefs and behaviors in our
children is in line with a study of children aged between 3 and 8
that found that children endorse fairness norms related to sharing,
but act inconsistently with these norms [31]. Again, this result is
evidence of strong inequity aversion, and suggests that inequity
aversion evolves much earlier than our capability of making finer
distinctions of procedural fairness and applying them to the
evaluation of outcomes. Children may thus learn fairness norms
before they become able to accept their consequences and make
adults’ distinctions about the acceptability of outcomes depending
upon how they originated. The split between mutual normative
expectations and Responders’ behavior suggests a split between an
early response to outcomes and a much later ability to evaluate
outcomes according to a culture’s norms that have been learned
quite early, but not fully absorbed.
A second possible explanation for the discrepancy between
fairness beliefs and decision in children may refer to the fact that
the fairness beliefs may result from an evaluation of the coin toss as
fair ‘‘in isolation’’, whereas the decision to refuse the 8,2 offer
deriving from coin may depend on the comparison of such offer
with the other options, i.e. children might think that the Proposer
would have been much more fair by offering 5,5 directly. If it
cannot be excluded that children might have expressed the fairness
judgment evaluating the coin toss procedure per se, it is also true
that the absence of a correlation between the Responder’s
behavior and second order false belief reasoning makes the
consequentialist interpretation the most plausible.
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Overall, our findings provide useful cues to better understand
children’s decision-making behavior not only in the lab, but also in
real life. In fact, even if some evidence exists showing that self-
selected students are an appropriate subject pool for the study of
social behavior in bargaining games [32], our sample of children is
not affected by the problem of self-selection, since they are not
volunteers. However, our findings are subject to some limitations.
First, in order to avoid learning effects, the actual procedure did
not provide Proposers with feedback between conditions. The
modification of this methodological option would allow exploring
the disposition of Proposers to take advantage of Coin in Full but
not in Private when we provide feedback about the Responder’s
decision. We also presented the information conditions in a fixed
order (Full, Private, and Limited) because we wanted to replicate
Bicchieri and Chavez [5] in order to compare children to adults.
Future research should address the possible influence of order on
normative beliefs by means of a different paradigm. Second, to
distinguish between an understanding of coin toss as a fair
procedure or as a fair offer the questionnaire about fairness beliefs
should be formulated in a comparative way, i.e. asking for a
fairness judgment of each offer option compared to the other
available options. Third, with respect to the theory of mind, we did
not find a significant effect of second order false belief
understanding on the norm of fairness. Although our evidence
may suggest that theory of mind – operationalized as false belief
understanding – does not much influence these decision processes,
it is possible that the task employed does not grasp the full
complexity of meta-representational ability. Future research
should use a larger battery of tests of theory of mind, also
including qualitative measures of the ability to adopt the
perspective of the other person and to empathize, which are
involved in social bargaining in adults [33].
Concluding, children show a developing awareness of the fact
that norms about fairness and normative expectations contribute
to decision-making behavior. Furthermore, children embody the
popular quote ‘‘easier said than done’’, as they reject the unfair
outcome of a decision judged as fair. They know what is fair, but
they do not know how to act consistently with their judgment.
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